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Lessons of Defeat and Success: Taiwan’s 
2012 Elections in Comparative Perspective 
Dafydd FELL and Charles CHEN 
Abstract: In early 2011, the Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) gov-
ernment appeared to be in danger of losing power in the upcoming 
presidential elections. The DPP had recovered sufficiently from its dis-
astrous electoral performance in 2008 to pose a real challenge to Ma 
Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) and had matched the KMT’s vote share in mid-
term local elections. Ma also faced the challenge of an independent 
presidential candidate, James Soong (Song Chuyu), who had come a 
close second in 2000 and now threatened to divide the pro KMT vote. 
Nevertheless, the KMT was able to win reduced majorities in both the 
presidential and legislative elections in January 2012. This article seeks to 
explain how the KMT was able to hold on to power by comparing the 
campaign with earlier national-level elections. We are interested in iden-
tifying the degree to which the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 
Minjindang) learnt from its electoral setbacks in 2008 and whether the 
KMT employed a similar campaign strategy to the one that had been so 
effective in returning it to power in 2008. Our analysis relies of an ex-
amination of campaign propaganda and campaign strategies as well as 
participant observation and survey data from 2012 and earlier contests.  
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Introduction 
In January 2012, Taiwan held combined national presidential and 
parliamentary elections on the same day for the first time in its his-
tory. One year earlier, the Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) gov-
ernment had appeared to be in danger of losing power in the upcom-
ing presidential elections. After coming to power through landslide 
election victories in 2008, the party’s popularity had slumped in the 
middle of the Ma Ying-jeou’s (俜㤡ҍ, Ma Yingjiu) first term. This 
led Shelley Rigger (2010) to write of “Ma’s midterm malaise”. An 
economic recession in 2009, together with poor handling of disaster 
relief, contributed to public satisfaction rates in Ma falling from 41 
per cent after his inauguration to only 16 per cent in late 2009 (TVBS 
Poll Center 2012a). Such a low level of public satisfaction was similar 
to that of Ma’s predecessor Chen Shui-bian (䲣≤ᡱ, Chen Shuibian) 
for much of his second term. The main opposition party, the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP), had recovered sufficiently from its 
disastrous electoral performance in 2008 to pose a real challenge to 
Ma and the KMT. Under its new leader, Tsai Ing-wen (㭑㤡᮷, Cai 
Yingwen), it had matched the KMT’s vote share in the mid-term local 
elections of 2009 and 2010 and won some remarkable Legislative 
Yuan by-election victories in KMT strongholds (Fell 2011: 229). Ma 
also faced the challenge of a presidential candidate named James 
Soong (ᆻᾊ⪌, Song Chuyu) and his People First Party (PFP). Soong 
had come a close second in the 2000 presidential election and now 
threatened to divide the pro KMT vote in both presidential and par-
liamentary contests.  
Nevertheless, as Tables 1 and 2 show, on voting day the KMT 
was able to win with reduced majorities in both the presidential and 
legislative elections in January 2012. In fact, the margin of victory was 
larger than most academic and party observers had predicted (Schu-
bert 2012: 144–145). In the presidential election, Ma won, with 51.6 
per cent of the vote compared to Tsai’s 45.6 per cent, while Soong 
mustered a mere 2.7 per cent. Four years earlier, Ma had gathered a 
historic high of 58.4 per cent of votes, compared to the DPP candi-
date’s 41.6 per cent. Ma’s vote share was higher than the previous 
record high gained by Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui) in 1996 of 54 per 
cent. In the parliamentary election, the KMT seat share fell from 
almost 72 per cent to 56.6 per cent and, while the DPP’s party list 
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vote share actually fell slightly, its seat share rose from 24 to 35.4 per 
cent. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, third parties had almost 
completely disappeared, but in 2012 the Taiwan Solidarity Union 
(TSU) and the PFP both won three seats each. The TSU’s 9 per cent 
party list vote share was its best performance since its creation in 
2001. Despite the KMT’s vote and seat reductions, it had retained a 
working majority in parliament, which meant that Taiwan would see 
another four years of unified government, with the presidency and 
parliament in KMT hands.  
Table 1: Vote and Seat Shares in National Parliamentary (Legislative 
Yuan and National Assembly) Elections 
 1998 2001 2004 2005 2008 2012 
KMT 46.4(54.7)
28.6
(30.2)
32.8
(35.1)
38.9
(39.4)
51.2
(71.7)
44.5 
(56.6) 
DPP 29.6(31.1)
33.4
(38.7)
35.7
(39.6)
42.5
(42.8)
36.9
(24)
34.6 
(35.4) 
NP 7.1(4.9)
2.9
(0.4)
0.1
(0.4)
0.9
(1)
4
(0)
1.5 
(0) 
PFP 18.6(20.2)
13.9
(15.1)
6.1
(6.1)
0
(0.9)
5.5 
(2.7) 
TSU 8.5 (5.8)
7.8
(5.3)
7.1
(7.1)
3.5
(0)
9 
(2.7) 
TIP 1.5(0.4)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0.6
(0.6)  
GP 0.1(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0.6
(0)
1.7 
(0) 
NHSU 1.2 (0) 
Relevant 
parties 3 4 4 4 2 4 
Note 1: Vote shares for the main political parties in legislative and National Assembly 
elections; seat shares are in parentheses.  
Note 2: Party abbreviations: KMT: Kuomintang; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; 
NP: New Party; PFP: People First Party; TSU: Taiwan Solidarity Union; TIP: 
Taiwan Independence Party, GP: Taiwan Green Party, NHSU: National Health 
System Union. 
Note 3: One of the PFP’s three official candidates won a seat in 2008. The PFP only 
had one (unsuccessful) district level candidate in 2008, who won 47.04 per 
cent of the vote in Lianjiang (忋㰇) County. This only amounted to 2,064 votes 
and represents 0.02 per cent of the national vote share. The successful PFP 
candidate won an aboriginal constituency seat with 11,925 votes; however 
votes for the aboriginal constituencies were not included in the Central Election 
Commission’s party vote share figures.  
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Note 4: The party vote share figures for the 2008 and 2012 legislative elections are 
from the party list votes.  
Source: National Chengchi University 2012a. 
Table 2: Vote Shares in Presidential Elections 
 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
KMT 54.0 23.1 49.9 58.45 51.6 
DPP 21.1 39.3 50.1 41.55 45.6 
NP 14.9 0.1    
PFP  36.8   2.7 
Note 1: The vote share for the NP in 1996 refers to the Lin Yang-kang ticket, which 
was supported by the NP but not officially a nominated NP candidate.  
Note 2: The PFP vote share in 2000 refers to James Soong’s independent candidacy. 
Soong went on to form the party following his narrow defeat in 2000.  
Source: National Chengchi University 2012a. 
This paper builds upon earlier analyses of the 2012 elections by Gun-
ter Schubert (2012) and Jonathan Sullivan (2013), with the two fol-
lowing main objectives. Firstly, we seek to compare the 2012 elec-
tions with some of the more recent national-level campaigns. We 
focus our comparison on public opinion and the content of political 
communication. Secondly, by looking at the elections comparatively, 
we consider how the KMT was able to hang on to power. Here we 
are interested in whether the parties have learnt the lessons of success 
or failure from previous campaigns.  
Although it would seem like common sense that parties would 
try to learn the lessons of defeat to improve their electoral prospects 
for the next round of elections, empirical evidence shows that often 
parties react irrationally to defeat. For example, the British Labour 
Party (after 1979) and Taiwan’s New Party (NP, after 1998) both 
moved away from the median voter after major defeats (Fell 2006: 
47–67). In both cases, they paid a severe electoral price for moving to 
extremes in the subsequent elections. How parties react to defeat 
often depends on who wins the struggle over the post-election post-
mortem. Norris and Lovenduski (2004: 85–104) suggested that par-
ties may suffer from “selective perception” in terms of how they 
understand election results, whereby leaders misinterpret opinion 
polls and other data to match their own existing convictions. Scholars 
have shown how the outcome of internal power struggles after elec-
tion defeat is also a central factor that drives party change. For in-
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stance, when electoral moderates became dominant in the DPP fol-
lowing its 1991 defeat, they gradually steered the party in a more cen-
trist direction (Kuo 1998). Lastly, we need to remember that promoters 
of party reforms face severe constraints from factions opposing re-
forms, particularly in older established parties. It is often safer to 
avoid what may seem like necessary but radical reform to avoid split-
ting the party and potentially losing existing core voters. In this study, 
we assess the degree to which the DPP learnt from its electoral set-
backs of 2008 in terms of its party image, nomination, policies and 
campaign style.  
We argue that there was more change than continuity in the key 
factors leading to the KMT victory in 2012 compared with 2008. In 
terms of continuity, the electoral system again favoured the KMT and 
as in most previous elections the KMT outspent its rivals on cam-
paign advertising by a significant margin. However, the central issues 
were completely different from 2008, with the KMT focusing on its 
achievements in economic growth and improved China relations, 
while the DPP stressed social justice. Thus, the KMT chose to use a 
very different set of appeals in 2012 compared to its winning issue 
formula from 2008. The DPP attempted to learn the lessons of defeat 
from 2008 in a number of policy and campaign adjustments. For 
instance, it tried to project itself as more pragmatic and moderate on 
relations with China. However, the DPP’s adjustments were not quite 
enough to overcome the KMT’s incumbency advantage.  
Data and Methods 
Despite a growing literature on political communication in Taiwan, 
the topic was initially neglected by political scientists. Instead, much 
of the best research has been published by scholars based in advertis-
ing departments. Three of the most prolific writers on the subject of 
Taiwan’s election advertising have been Cheng Tzu-leong (䝝㠚䲶, 
Zheng Zilong), Chang Ching-ching (ᕥযয, Zhang Qingqing) and 
Niu Tse-hsun (㍀ࡷण, Niu Zexun), all of whom are based in adver-
tising departments and have published predominantly in Chinese. 
Cheng Tzu-leong can be regarded as the pioneering figure in the 
study of Taiwanese election advertising and his books offer readers 
detailed reviews of advertising strategies for almost every election 
campaign since the early 1990s (Cheng 1992, 1995, 2011). Chang 
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Ching-ching has often looked at the subject comparatively. For in-
stance, she has compared political advertising in Taiwanese and 
American presidential campaigns, as well as comparing the ability of 
candidates and the media to set the presidential campaign agendas 
(Chang 2000, 2007). The most recent entrant has been Niu, who has 
already published a number of volumes examining Taiwan’s local and 
national elections after 2000 from the perspective of advertising theo-
ries (Niu 2002, 2005).  
The English-language literature on Taiwanese political commu-
nication began to develop in the post-2000 period. For instance, Gary 
Rawnsley has examined the growing professionalisation of campaign-
ing and critiqued the use of the Americanisation approach on Tai-
wan’s campaigning (Rawnsley 2003, 2006). A number of studies have 
applied statistical analysis as well as detailed qualitative content ana-
lysis to Taiwanese election advertising. For instance, Dafydd Fell has 
used a mix of qualitative and quantitative content analysis to plot 
patterns of party change in Taiwanese elections before and after 2000 
(Fell 2005, 2011). In other words, the focus has been on what politi-
cal communication can tell us about whether Taiwan’s parties were 
moving towards the centre or becoming more polarised. More re-
cently, Jonathan Sullivan has published a series of systematic content 
analysis studies that rely on quantitative methods (Sullivan 2008, 
2009). These studies give readers a clearer picture on the balance 
between negative and positive advertising and the degree to which 
advertising addresses issues, values, traits and strategy.  
In our study, we have employed a range of data to compare the 
2012 campaign with earlier elections. For instance, we have made 
extensive use of polls conducted by the TVBS polling centre related 
to party image, pre-election support rates and responses to election 
debates. As Schubert (2012: 150) notes, “Many opinion polls in Tai-
wan are politically biased in Taiwan”. Therefore, we must keep in 
mind the political orientation of the polling organisations’ propri-
etors. For instance, TVBS polls do often appear to underestimate 
support for the DPP. However, TVBS polls have the advantage of 
accessibility and their polling frequency allows time series analysis. In 
fact, both 2008 and 2012 TVBS pre-election polls actually turned out 
to be quite accurate in their predictions.  
We chose to conduct a qualitative review of television election 
advertising for the last two presidential campaigns. The reason for 
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focusing on television advertising is that this represents one of, if not 
the largest single spending item in election campaigns in Taiwan. 
Moreover, the high penetration of election ads across TV channels 
means they are unavoidable in Taiwan. In contrast to the statistical 
approach adopted by Sullivan, we chose to conduct a qualitative con-
tent analysis of television election ads. The main reason for this was 
to highlight the core issues and appeals that dominated the agenda. 
Our dataset included all election television ads that were broadcast 
between June and voting day for elections in 2008 and 2012 and our 
dataset was supplied by the advertising analysis company Rainmaker 
XFM. The ads were divided into three main categories: those issued 
by presidential campaigns, party centre ads, and those for individual 
legislative candidates. The full details of the ads are shown on Tables 
5–7. While both Sullivan and Schubert concentrated their analysis on 
the China issue in the 2012 campaign, we have attempted to use our 
content analysis to reveal a broader range of campaign appeals and 
issues.  
A final element of our examination involved long-term observa-
tion and participation in Taiwanese election campaigning. One author 
has joined multiple Taiwanese election observation groups, while the 
second author worked in multiple elections as a campaigner, includ-
ing as a presidential campaign spokesperson in 2012.  
Pre-election Opinion Polls  
A first place to compare this campaign is the pre-election opinion 
polls. The TVBS candidate support-level polls between July 2011 and 
January 2012 are displayed in Table 3. This suggests that although the 
election was close, Ma consistently led the field and, in the final 
month, Ma’s support level was actually on the rise, as opposed to a 
slight decline in Tsai’s support. The most important shift appears to 
have been the gradual erosion in support for the third candidate, 
Soong, which appears to have favoured Ma. The majority of polls, 
regardless of partisan bias, did suggest Ma held a narrow lead 
throughout the campaign. In 2008, Ma was also consistently ahead of 
his DPP challenger; the difference was that while in 2008 Ma’s lead 
averaged about 20 points, this time it was rarely more than 5–6 per 
cent (TVBS Poll Center 2012c). As in 2008, the DPP had hoped that 
its support rate would gain momentum during the campaign, but 
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Table 3 again shows that this surge in support failed to materialise. 
Thus 2008 and 2012 stand in stark contrast to 2000 and 2004, where 
the DPP progressively eroded the KMT’s lead as the campaign pro-
gressed, so that it was finally able to win by narrow margins (Fell 
2011: 213, 218).  
Table 3: Pre-election Presidential Polls for 2012 
 7/
21 
8/ 
15 
8/ 
30 
9/
14 
10/
6 
10/
26 
11/
23 
12/
10 
12/
29 
Jan 
13 
Ma 38 39 40 42 40 42 39 41 44 43
Tsai 36 35 32 34 33 33 39 37 38 35
Soong 13 16 17 15 14 13 9 8 6 6
DK 12 9 12 11 13 12 12 14 12 16
Source: TVBS Poll Center 2012d. 
Another way to examine the competitiveness of the campaign is to 
compare the sociological background of the supporters of the rival 
presidential campaigns. A key feature of the 2008 campaign opinion 
polls was that Ma was ahead by wide margins among almost all major 
ethnic groups, education levels, genders, geographical regions and age 
groups (TVBS Poll Center 2008a). For instance, Ma had a 53 to 23-
point lead among female voters and even in the supposedly pro-DPP 
far south (Gaoxiong (儈䳴), Penghu (▾⒆) and Pingdong (ቿᶡ)) he 
led by 47 points to 34. Amongst non-partisans, Ma led by 45 percent-
age points to 17. A sign of the greater level of competition in 2012 
was that Tsai had higher support rates in the south and south-central 
counties (Yunlin (䴢᷇), Jiayi (హ㗙) and Tainan (ਠই)), amongst 
voters in the 20–29 and 30–39 age ranges, those who had up to junior 
high school education, and among Minnan voters (TVBS Poll Center 
2012c). Tsai also narrowed the KMT lead in many of the KMT’s 
strongholds and support groups. One key such geographic region was 
central Taiwan, where in 2008 Ma led by 52 percentage points to 26, 
compared to a lead of 45 to 30 in 2012. However, although Tsai was 
the first female presidential candidate and made her gender an im-
portant component of her campaign, she still trailed Ma amongst 
female voters by 32 to 44 per cent. Tsai’s expansion of support was 
also limited among Hakka voters, with a rise from 21 per cent in 2008 
to 30 in 2012, but this still left Ma with almost a 20-point advantage 
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with this ethnic group. The DPP’s support had risen in almost all 
TVBS background groups, with the exception of Mainlanders. Here 
Tsai’s support rate was actually lower in 2012 at 12 per cent com-
pared to 20 per cent for Hsieh in 2008, while Ma’s rose from 72 to 74 
per cent.  
These trends suggest that the DPP had learnt some key lessons 
from 2008. Firstly, it had won back much of the lost support in the 
south that had defected to Ma in 2008. It had also regained its ad-
vantage among younger voters, with whom it had been the most 
popular party from the mid-1990s through to 2005. It had also nar-
rowed the KMT’s lead in its stronger areas, particularly in central 
Taiwan. However, the data suggests that Tsai was not able to expand 
DPP support level sufficiently in key groups such as females, the 
highly educated and in northern Taiwan to win the election.  
Table 4: Party Identification Trends 2004–2012 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
KMT 21.2 31.2 35.5 34 35.5 33.9 32.8 39.5 35.5 
DPP 24.7 21.6 18.7 20.1 21.2 19.5 26.2 24.9 24.5 
NP 1 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.1 0 
PFP 9.6 4 2 1.1 1.5 1.2 2 3.3 3.1 
TSU 2.4 3.4 2.7 1.2 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 2.4 
Ind 41.1 39.3 40.5 42.9 38.3 43.3 37.1 30.4 33.9 
Source: National Chengchi University 2012b. 
When it came to the parliamentary election, the KMT was in an even 
stronger position. It not only had a huge incumbency advantage, but 
it also had much higher levels of party identification than the DPP. 
The key trends in party identification change over the last nine years 
are shown in Table 4. In both pre-election years (2007 and 2011) the 
KMT had a 15-point lead on the DPP. The table suggests that Tsai’s 
leadership did contribute to the DPP’s recovery, with the highest 
DPP party identification in 2010 at 26.2 per cent. However, in the 
pre- and post-election polls (2011 and 2012), DPP support was close 
to its average for Chen’s first term of about 24 per cent. Interestingly, 
the KMT recorded its record high identification in 2011 of 39 per 
cent. Therefore, the table suggests that while the DPP won back 
much of its lost support under Tsai, the DPP had reached a similar 
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ceiling to that hit during the Chen Shui-bian era of approximately 25 
per cent. If the DPP wants to ever become the majority party in the 
Legislative Yuan, it will need to find a way to break through this ceil-
ing.  
When we examine the respective party images in surveys in early 
2008 and 2012, we can see a remarkable pattern of change. The 
TVBS party image survey tests respondents’ views on the degree to 
which parties value public opinion, are free from corruption, have 
vitality, stress reform, possess party unity and have the ability to be 
introspective (TVBS Poll Center 2008c, 2012b). In 2008, the KMT 
had clear leads on all these dimensions, but this was largely reversed 
four years later, with the DPP ahead on all but two dimensions, on 
which the parties remained more or less tied (TVBS Poll Center 
2008c, 2012b); namely, being free from corruption and party unity. 
The degree of change is apparent in the item that asks whether the 
parties emphasise public opinion. On this dimension, the KMT fell 
from 56 per cent in January 2008 to 29 per cent in April 2012, while 
the DPP rose from 33 per cent to 57 per cent during the same period. 
Similarly, the DPP had improved its reputation on the political cor-
ruption issue, an issue that had contributed significantly to its fall 
from power in 2008. At the height of the Red Shirts Anti-Corruption 
movement in 2006, only 14 per cent of respondents viewed the DPP 
as being free of corruption, but this had risen to 34 per cent in 2012. 
Lin Chiung-chu (᷇⫺⨐ , Lin Qiongzhu) (2006) has argued that 
changing party images contributed to Taiwan’s changed party system 
in the 1990s. In other words, the KMT’s shift to predominantly nega-
tive images while the DPP was improving its image both contributed 
to their respective electoral fortunes in the period leading up to the 
KMT’s fall from power in 2000. The trends observed in these party 
image surveys show that the DPP had gone some way towards repair-
ing the damage to its reputation suffered during the second Chen 
term, and this was a factor in the parties’ improved electoral perform-
ance in 2012. These trends also serve as a warning to the KMT for 
the next round of elections in 2014 and 2016.  
The party identification and actual election results suggest that 
the 2012 election came at the wrong time for the DPP. In 2010 it had 
won a larger vote share in the special municipality elections than the 
KMT and tied with the KMT on council seats (130 each). Therefore, 
by the time of the presidential election in early 2012, Tsai Ing-wen 
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may have already passed her peak of popularity. Another potential 
explanation is that voters were prepared to trust the DPP with local 
executive and assembly office but were not yet ready to return it to 
national government. 
Impact of Election System and Combining the 
Elections
One of the key features of the 2008 election was the first use of Tai-
wan’s new electoral system. This was the result of constitutional re-
forms passed in 2005 that halved the number of legislators from 225 
to 113 and replaced the old predominantly multiple-member district 
single non-transferable vote system with what is commonly called the 
single-member district two-vote system (Cabestan 2008). Taiwan’s 
new system is very similar to that adopted by Japan after 1993. In this 
system, voters have two votes: one for a single member district can-
didate and the second for their party of preference. There are now 73 
single-member districts, with a further 34 seats allocated proportion-
ally between parties receiving more than 5 per cent of the vote on the 
second ballot. The remaining six seats are allocated to two three-seat 
aboriginal constituencies. 
In 2008, the new electoral system had two critical results, as vis-
ible in Table 1. Firstly, it squeezed the space for smaller third parties, 
so that they were no longer competitive at the district level and strug-
gled at the party list level to break the required 5 per cent threshold 
needed to win seats. Thus, in 2008, a single PFP candidate was the 
sole third party representative elected. Secondly, the new winner-
takes-all system seemed to favour the KMT, as it managed to gain 
almost three quarters of the seats with just over 50 per cent of the 
overall vote. Thus the new system produced a disproportional par-
liament.  
In contrast, combining the two elections in 2012 appears to have 
contributed to a more proportional election result. The KMT’s seat 
bonus fell to just over 10 per cent, while the DPP achieved rough 
parity in its party list vote (34.6 per cent) and seat (35.4 per cent) 
shares. A major feature of 2012 was the re-emergence of the third 
parties. This time, the PFP challenged the KMT in both districts and 
the party list. Moreover, a key motivation for Soong to stand in the 
presidential election was to create space for his own PFP legislative 
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candidates. The fact that the PFP party list vote share exceeded 
Soong’s presidential vote and that he had three legislators elected 
suggests the strategy worked. Even though the TSU did not have a 
presidential candidate, the support of its spiritual leader Lee Teng-hui 
(ᵾⲫ䕍, Li Denghui) for Tsai at the closing election evening rally 
appeared to have been instrumental in the party’s quite extraordinary 
party list vote of almost 9 per cent.  
These figures show that the DPP and the smaller parties have 
learnt some of the lessons from 2008 in terms of how to adapt to the 
new electoral system. A key comparative success for the DPP was 
that it persuaded the TSU not to nominate district-level candidates 
that had diluted the pro DPP or Pan Green votes four years earlier. 
In contrast, in 2012 the KMT faced difficulties handling its relations 
with its allied parties compared with 2008. In 2008 the KMT had 
been in effect the sole Pan Blue party. Four years later, however, in 
addition to Soong’s presidential challenge, official KMT candidates 
were challenged by the PFP in ten districts, and the PFP and NP 
competed with the KMT for party list votes. Despite the PFP’s chal-
lenge to the KMT, all the former PFP legislative candidates who had 
stood on the KMT ticket in 2008 chose to stay with the KMT in 2012 
rather than defect back to Soong. 
As mentioned above, the legislative and presidential elections 
were held together on the same day for the first time ever in 2012. 
There have been clear efforts in recent years to combine elections to 
a greater extent than in the past. Although the official reason given 
for this was to save resources, partisan motivations would have been 
paramount in decision makers’ minds. The KMT’s original motiva-
tion would have been that combining the two would enable incum-
bent legislators to promote Ma’s presidential campaign. Tables 1 and 
3 show that the DPP has generally performed far better in presiden-
tial elections than in parliamentary elections. Therefore, we can sur-
mise the DPP was hoping that a strong presidential campaign could 
boost the chances of new and less well-known legislative candidates. 
In 2008 the legislative election had been held just two months before 
the presidential one in March. On that occasion, the overwhelming 
KMT legislative majority did give a boost to Ma’s presidential cam-
paign.  
At this stage it is impossible to reach definite conclusions on 
which side benefitted most from combining elections, but we can 
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reach some tentative hypotheses on the impact. Firstly, it is possible 
the KMT would have benefitted more from separate elections, as it 
did in 2008. However, the slump in Ma’s popularity after winning in 
January 2012, to a public satisfaction level on inauguration in May of 
just 20 per cent suggests that a later election might have been risky 
(TVBS 2012a). A second finding is that combining the elections actu-
ally had a greater impact on raising legislative turnout, which rose 
from 58.7 per cent in 2008 to 74.2 per cent in 2012. Another key 
feature of the campaign in 2012 was that the legislative campaign was 
almost completely submerged by the presidential one, as the former 
struggled to attract media attention. This naturally has implications 
for democratic accountability as one lesson of the post 2000 era for 
Taiwanese politics has been the increasing importance of the Legisla-
tive Yuan.  
A long-term feature of the DPP’s electoral performance has 
been that its parliamentary vote share has tended to lag behind its 
presidential vote share. This was evident when Chen came to power 
in 2000 and his party held less than one-third of the legislative seats. 
However, if we compare the parties’ presidential and district vote 
shares of 2008 and 2012, combining the elections seems to have 
served to reduce the gap between presidential and parliamentary vote 
shares at the district level. DPP legislative candidates appear to have 
benefitted the most, with a rise of almost 6 per cent in vote share, 
while the presidential rise was only 4 per cent. This was by far the 
DPP’s highest ever parliamentary vote share for its district candidates 
and the first time there has been approximate parity between its presi-
dential and legislative vote share.  
Nevertheless, in some regions local factors meant that legislative 
candidates gained higher vote shares than their presidential candi-
dates in 2012. Key instances of this were Taidong (ਠᶡ) and Penghu, 
where the DPP legislative candidates won with vote shares exceeding 
those of Tsai. This was the first time the party had won these legisla-
tive seats in general elections since the lifting of martial law and in 
2008 the DPP had not even been able to find a candidate for Tai-
dong. The combined elections also allowed some districts to return to 
normality. For instance, the KMT did manage to win back some of 
the seats it had lost in by-elections, such as in Taoyuan (ṳൂ) and 
Xinzhu (ᯠㄩ) Counties.  
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Candidates and Nomination 
Candidate nomination has often been a critical variable in explaining 
results in Taiwan (Fell 2013). In 2000, the KMT’s failure to resolve its 
nomination dispute in the presidential election led to two KMT can-
didates standing, enabling the DPP’s Chen to win with just 39 per 
cent of the vote. In 2008, the KMT was more successful at handling 
nomination in both presidential and legislative elections, which con-
tributed to its strong performance. For instance, it essentially resolved 
its presidential nomination in 2005. Similarly, its party primaries en-
sured it had fewer rebel legislative candidates. In contrast, the DPP 
suffered from quite divisive primaries that served to undermine both 
its campaigns in 2008. Both parties had quite successful nomination 
processes in 2012. Ma was unchallenged at the presidential level and 
although there were more KMT legislative rebel candidates in 2012 
than 2008, the problem was not too severe. Both main parties used 
opinion-poll-based primaries where nomination was contested for the 
first time at the national-level elections. This time, the DPP’s prima-
ries were concluded far more successfully and amicably than four 
years earlier.  
The four-person competition in the DPP for the presidential 
nomination was largely between the party leader Tsai Ing-wen and 
former premier Su Tseng-chang (㰷䋎᰼, Su Zhenchang). The fact 
that Tsai won the primary, albeit by a small margin, suggests the party 
was trying to project an image starkly different from the past. Su, like 
most previous DPP presidential candidates, had begun his political 
career in the struggle for democracy under martial law and had exten-
sive electoral experience at a range of executive and legislative levels. 
In contrast, Tsai was a Western-educated former academic who had 
only joined the DPP a few years before becoming chairperson in 
2008. The 2012 presidential election was only Tsai’s second ever 
campaign as a candidate. The DPP hoped this fresh image would 
enable the party to expand its support vote among swing voters. 
However, the presidential vote share suggests that other than winning 
back voters lost in 2008, she did not expand the party’s vote share 
sufficiently among floating voters to unseat Ma.  
Under the old legislative electoral system, a key aspect of win-
ning was to nominate the right number of candidates in a district and 
to ensure an even distribution of votes amongst these candidates. The 
new single-member district operates quite differently, as the key to 
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success is to nominate a single candidate who has the district-wide 
strength to gain 50 per cent of the votes. Even though the DPP did 
significantly improve its district vote and seat share in 2012, it also 
made some serious nomination errors that undermined its overall 
campaign. One such instance was its handling of Taibei (ਠे) city 
legislative districts, where, apart from Taibei City 2, most of the 
DPP’s candidates were extremely weak. This enabled the KMT to 
win easily in all these districts. In contrast, many of its more electoral-
ly experienced politicians, who had the ability to compete at the dis-
trict level, were safely nominated on the party list. For instance, al-
though Hsiao Bi-khim (㮝㖾⩤, Xiao Meiqin) had rich experience in 
Taibei and even almost won in the KMT stronghold of Hualian (㣡㬞) 
in 2010, she was nominated on the party list in 2012. The KMT 
gained positive media attention by nominating what it called “assas-
sins” against prominent DPP candidates. These were younger candi-
dates with clean images, such as the 35-year-old former Government 
Information Minister Su Chun-bin (㰷׺䌃, Su Junbin), who stood 
against the former DPP Tainan City Mayor Hsu Tian-tsai (䁡␫䋑, 
Xu Tiancai).  
Campaign Methods and Communication 
Traditionally, the KMT has had the key advantage of having the fi-
nancial resources to outspend its rival parties in campaign spending. 
This was best illustrated in the 2000 presidential election when the 
KMT’s presidential TV ads amounted to over 28,000 minutes of 
broadcast time, more than the combined total for the DPP and 
Soong (Fell 2011: 71). In the first three presidential elections the 
KMT had double the number of TV ads of its DPP rivals (Sullivan 
2008: 905). We can get a taste of levels of campaign spending in 2008 
and 2012 from Tables 5 and 6, which show the numbers of election 
television ads. A first lesson is that there was a significant reduction 
in the number of ads in 2012 of all three categories. This indicates 
that holding the legislative and presidential elections on the same day 
clearly caused a drop in the number of advertisements. When com-
paring parties, we can see that whereas there was rough parity in the 
number of TV ads in 2008, four years later the DPP reduced the 
number of its ads, leaving the KMT with more than double the num-
ber of ads placed by the DPP. In 2012, KMT had 67 presidential ads 
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compared to 30 DPP ones and the corresponding figures for party 
ads were 47 to 13. Here we should note that the scale of KMT pro-
duction of ads was even larger on its online-only broadcast adver-
tisements. For instance, it included a number of short films, such as 
the 20-minute-long National Flag Girl (഻ᰇྣᆙ, Guoqi nühai) (2011), 
which were available online but not broadcast on television. One 
estimate from the advertising analysis company Rainmaker XFM 
suggests that in the seven months prior to the 2012 voting day, the 
KMT spent 265 million TWD on election advertising, compared to 
179 million TWD by the DPP (Rainmaker XFM). In other words, the 
KMT again outspent its rivals in political advertising.  
Table 5: Television Election Advertisements in 2008 
 
Presidential 
ads 
Party Centre 
ads 
Legislative 
candidate 
ads 
Total ads 
KMT 68 32 30 130 
DPP 49 45 41 135 
PFP  0 0 0 
TSU  11 1 12 
NP  14  14 
Independents   1 1 
Other parties  15  15 
Total 117 102 73 292 
Note 1: In 2008, other parties included the Home Party (䲭源), Third Society Party (䫔
ᶱ䣦㚫源), Taiwan Farmer’s Party (⎘䀋彚㮹源), Taiwan Constitution Associa-
tion (⇞ㅚ倗䚇), Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (䃉源⛀䳸倗䚇).  
Note 2: Data starts from completion of nomination in June 2007.  
Note 3: This shows the number of individual advertisements that were broadcast on 
television, but does not reflect the actual broadcast time of each ad.  
Source: Dataset supplied by Rainmaker XFM International Corporation.  
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Table 6: Television Election Advertisements in 2012 
 
Presidential 
ads 
Party Centre 
ads 
Legislative 
candidate 
ads 
Total ads 
KMT 67 47 15 129 
DPP 30 13 12 55 
PFP 2 2  4 
TSU  3  3 
NP  2  2 
Independents   17 17 
Other parties   3 3 
Total 99 67 47 213 
Note 1: Tsai support ad was added to the presidential total. 
Note 2: Other parties in 2012 were National Health System Union (‍ᾅ⃵屣忋䶂),
Taiwan Basic Law Party (ᷕ厗㮹⚳⎘䀋➢㛔㱽忋䶂).  
Note 3: Data starts from completion of nomination in July 2011.  
Source: Dataset supplied by Rainmaker XFM International Corporation. 
Taiwan has held televised election candidate debates since the 1994 
Taibei mayoral election. These have also been held for presidential 
elections since 2000, and in 2012 two such debates were held for the 
three presidential candidates and one for the vice-presidential candi-
dates. Such debates should have placed Ma in a stronger position, as 
he had participated in televised debates since the 1998 Taibei mayoral 
election. He also had conducted a televised debate with Tsai over the 
proposed Economic Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China in 
April 2010, a debate that most pundits felt Ma had won. A TVBS 
(2010) survey showed viewers generally agreed, with 46 per cent of 
viewers believing he had performed better against 34 for Tsai. In 
2008, viewers also felt Ma performed better in the two debates than 
Frank Hsieh (䅍䮧ᔧ, Xie Changting) by a margin of 42 to 28 per 
cent (TVBS 2008b). Tsai and her team had clearly tried to learn some 
of the lessons from these earlier debates, as while viewers felt Ma had 
narrowly edged the first debate in the 2012 campaign, they felt Tsai 
had won the second (TVBS 2011).  
 
 
 
 30 Dafydd Fell and Charles Chen 
Table 7: Main Campaign Appeals in 2008 and 2012 
2008 KMT DPP 
  Attacking DPP govern-
ment performance 
 Ma’s appeal 
 Economic record and 
pledges  
 Stable cross-Strait relations 
 Attacking DPP’s corrup-
tion 
 Attacking Chen  
 Ma’s performances (long 
stay and cycle tour)  
 Taiwan identity 
 Ethnic harmony 
 Questioning KMT loyalty 
to Taiwan 
 One China Common 
Market 
 Don’t let Taiwan become 
another Tibet 
 Attacking KMT’s assets 
 Social welfare  
 UN referendum  
 Anti-Ma (corruption and 
green card issue) 
 Attacking KMT for block-
ing good legislation  
Negative or 
Positive 
More negative in legislative 
campaign and largely positive 
in presidential campaign 
Both negative and positive in 
both campaigns 
2012 KMT DPP 
  ROC nationalism and 
Taiwan identity Go Tai-
wan) 
 Achievements on China 
relations 
 Accusations of corruption 
against Tsai 
 DPP-era corruption 
 Ma’s wife 
 Ethnic harmony 
 Clean governance 
 Golden 10-year period 
 Ma’s character 
 Comparing KMT 
achievements with those 
of the DPP era 
 Piggy banks,  
 Social justice and inequali-
ty 
 Anti-nuclear power 
 Vague on China 
 First female president 
 Tsai’s appeal 
 Change 
 Economic failures, (un-
employment, price rises) 
 Taiwan identity 
 Both but more negative than 
2008 
Both but more positive than 
2008 
Source: Dataset supplied by Rainmaker XFM. 
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Both major parties showed elements of continuity and change in their 
approach to campaign issues and appeals in 2012 compared to four 
years earlier. We have attempted to summarise some of these in Table 
7, which shows the main appeals adopted by the parties in the two 
campaigns. The KMT’s identity message showed considerable change 
from 2008. For instance, it reintroduced its dual ROC Chinese and 
Taiwan identity appeal in contrast to the much more Taiwan-themed 
campaign of 2008. For instance, the ROC flag was prominent in a 
large number of ads and, of course, the above-mentioned short film 
National Flag Girl. This is best represented in the Real Taiwan Spirit Ad 
(ⵏਠ⚓㋮⾎ㇷ, Zhen Taiwan jingshen pian), where we see images of 
youngsters celebrating and riding bikes with ROC flags. Meanwhile 
we see images of Ma writing the characters “Real Taiwan” (ⵏਠ⚓, 
Zhen Taiwan) with a calligraphy brush and ending with the red ink 
stamp ROC. Ma narrates the ad, telling the audience about what he 
calls the “real Taiwan spirit”. An ad that attempted to promote the 
KMT style ROC nationalism was the National Flag Ad (഻ᰇㇷ, Guoqi 
pian), which shows people from different generations waving and 
wearing ROC flags (including the bra version) with an upbeat version 
of the national flag anthem as background music. The ad ends with 
the slogan “thanks to all those that have waved the national flag; 
compared to the DPP you are the ones that really protect the ROC’s 
dignity”. The national flag anthem is the one Taiwan uses in interna-
tional sports events, including the Olympics, and is therefore de-
signed to remind Taiwanese people of moments of national sporting 
pride. Even more traditional was an ad on programmes promoting 
Confucianist education in Taiwan and China for infants, which was a 
real appeal to Chinese traditional cultural identity. There were again 
appeals to ethnic harmony. The best example of this appeal is the 
Happy Gathering Song Ad (↑′ⅼㇷ, Huanle ge pian), which uses Tai-
wanese, Hakka and aboriginal lyrics to sing about ethnic harmony and 
has images of the main ethnic groups. Ma is again shown in his tradi-
tional Chinese clothes and writing “Go Taiwan” (ਠ⚓࣐⋩, Taiwan 
jiayou) with a calligraphy brush. This song has been used repeatedly by 
Ma since 1998 and was the first TV ad released by the Ma Camp in 
the 2012 election.  
Overall, the tone of the KMT campaign was more negative in 
2012 than in 2008. For instance, a series of newspaper ads placed by 
the KMT legislative party caucus accused Tsai of personally profiting 
 32 Dafydd Fell and Charles Chen 
from a biotech company investment case that she had approved 
while she was vice-premier under Chen (United Daily News 2012a). By 
talking of the KMT’s record on cracking down on corruption, the ad 
asked voters to recall DPP scandals. For example, in one KMT TV 
ad the former Health Minister Yang Chih-liang (ὺᘇ㢟, Yang Zhi-
liang) argued that he is concerned that the people surrounding Tsai 
are from the Chen era. The KMT had benefitted considerably by 
using this anti-corruption appeal in 2008, but four years later its im-
pact would have been much reduced as memories of DPP scandals 
had faded.  
As in 2008, the KMT tried to inspire hope for the future in its 
ads. For instance, 2012 again saw KMT ads featuring sky lanterns 
with people’s wishes for the future. However, while in 2008 the KMT 
had made a range of pledges on what it would do in the future re-
garding China and economic goals, this time it was much more cau-
tious on new pledges, beyond talking of a Golden Ten Years (哳䠁ॱ
ᒤ, Huangjin shi nian). In fact, three months before the election, Ma 
had to apologise for his failure to deliver his 2008 pledge of 6 per 
cent economic growth rate, per capita GDP of 30,000 USD and a 3 
per cent unemployment rate (Sullivan 2013: 69). Yang Chih-liang also 
fronted ads carrying the slogan that “Reforms cannot stop” (᭩䶙н
㜭ڌ, Gaige bu neng ting), although it was not made clear what kind of 
reforms were envisaged (United Daily News 2012b). Instead it concen-
trated much more on its record. For instance, many ads compared 
the KMT’s record on a range of issues (such as agricultural exports, 
dealing with corruption and attracting overseas tourists) to that of the 
DPP’s eight years in power.  
As this was a presidential election, the KMT candidate was 
prominent in its ads, although there were some differences in this 
regard compared to 2008. For instance, in many districts KMT can-
didates did not include Ma in their campaign literature, especially in 
southern districts where the DPP enjoys stronger support than the 
KMT. In contrast, in 2008 Ma was much more prominent in KMT 
legislators’ candidate’s literature. Another major difference was that 
Ma’s wife Chou Mei-ching (ઘ㖾䶂, Zhou Meiqing) received far more 
coverage at rallies and in TV advertising in this campaign than ever 
before. This may have been partly to counteract the DPP’s female 
candidate appeal.  
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The degree of political communication change was much greater 
on the part of the DPP than the KMT. This is not entirely surprising, 
considering how Tsai’s background is so different from earlier DPP 
presidential candidates. Much of the DPP campaign was centred on 
Tsai herself and her personality. At the outset of the campaign we see 
ads showing her on her 2011 European trip, with one ad shot in Ber-
lin and another at her alma mater, the London School of Economics. 
On both occasions the music was Western and youth-oriented. She 
appealed to voters as being Taiwanese and as potentially the first 
female president. Overall, however, while she did use Taiwan identity 
appeals, the tone was much lighter than previous DPP campaigns. 
Her central slogan was “Taiwan Next”. Like Barack Obama in the 
United States and Ma in 2008, change was a key theme for Tsai. For 
instance, in the Last Four Years Ad (䙉ഋᒤㇷ, Zhe si nian pian), voters 
are asked to “Give Tsai Ing-wen a chance to Change Taiwan” (㎖㭑
㤡᮷аػ᭩䆺ਠ⚓Ⲵ₏ᴳ, Gei Cai Yingwen yi ge gaibian Taiwan de jihui). 
Nevertheless, she used the term “next” much more often than 
“change” in the campaign, implying reform rather than revolutionary 
change. We should also note that she was generally rather vague on 
what kind of change she envisaged. There were some niche appeals 
such as a nuclear-free homeland; however, environmental issues are 
rarely central issues that determine voting behaviour in Taiwanese 
campaigns. Overall, the more moderate tone visible in the DPP’s 
propaganda in 2012 was meant to reassure floating voters that if Tsai 
were elected it would not bring domestic or cross-Strait instability. 
If Tsai had one major theme, it would be social justice. She ad-
dressed this in a number of ways. The terms fairness and justice were 
prominent in campaign literature. Voters were frequently reminded of 
the growing inequality of the last four years. For instance, in front of 
the KMT party headquarters a huge DPP poster showed the picture 
of an unemployed man sitting disconsolately on a park bench and the 
slogan “Ma Ying-jeou, it’s your turn to take a non-salaried vacation”  
(俜㤡ҍᨋ֐᭮❑㯚ٷҶ, Ma Yingjiu, huan ni fang wuxinjia le). In the 
“Last four years” ad the DPP tries to remind voters of what has gone 
wrong under Ma by asking questions like:  
How have you been the last four years? Have you bought a house? 
Can you stand the rises in the cost of oil, pot noodles, milk pow-
der and tuition fees? Have you found the job you want? Has your 
salary risen?  
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We then see the image of a Ma Ying-jeou key ring (suggesting the ad 
is aimed at voters who opted for Ma four years earlier). It then asks 
“Can you take another four years like this?” It then calls on voters to: 
“On January 14, implement social justice” (аᴸॱഋ㲏ᯭ㹼ޜᒣ↓㗙, 
Yi yue shisi hao shixing gongping zhengyi). The DPP also tried to visualise 
the growing disparities in society in the Equal Society Government’s Re-
sponsibility Ad (ޜᒣ⽮ᴳ᭯ᓌ䋜Ӫㇷ, Gongping shehui zhengfu ze ren pian), 
which had similarities to the famous British Labour Party ad of 1992 
known as Jennifer’s Ear. In this case we see two young men about the 
same age at a bus stop and are told that though they are close together, 
what they are thinking about is far apart. One looks at a flyer for 
short-term loans, while the other checks the latest stock market 
trends on his iPad. One closes the door to his Porsche and the other 
gives up trying to start his battered motorbike. Another key element 
of the social justice appeal was its piggy-bank initiative. This involved 
grassroots supporters using small plastic piggy-banks to make dona-
tions to the Tsai campaign. This was designed to contrast small dona-
tions to the DPP with the KMT’s backing from big business and its 
massive party assets. Of course, social justice had been something the 
DPP had given much attention to since the early 1990s. However, the 
way it dealt with the issue in 2012 was quite different. In the past, the 
DPP had stressed resolving the issue through social welfare pro-
grammes, such as old age allowances in the 1990s and 2000 cam-
paign. Even in 2008, the message had been that if Taiwan can recover 
the KMT’s party assets then the state would be able to expand wel-
fare schemes. Thus, the major difference of Tsai’s social justice cam-
paign was that it lacked the substance of earlier DPP campaigns.  
The China Issue 
It is common for overseas journalistic reviews to simplify Taiwan’s 
elections as battles between unification and independence or being 
pro-China versus anti-China. At times the Taiwanese press carries a 
similar message. For instance, the day after the 2012 election, the 
United Daily News front page headline was “Ma Ying-jeou has won; 
the 1992 Consensus has won” (俜㤡ҍ䌿Ҷ 92ޡ䆈䌿Ҷ, Ma Yingjiu 
ying le 92 gong shi yingle) (Qian, Lin, and Wang 2012). In other words, it 
framed the election as a referendum on Ma’s handling of Cross-Strait 
Relations over the last four years. The China issue did play a more 
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important role in the campaign in 2012 than 2008, though it was 
more complicated than the newspaper headline suggested.  
Both in 2008 and as recently as 2010, DPP TV ads had warned 
of the dangers of KMT plans for economic integration with China. In 
2008, the focus was on the threats of what it called the “One China 
Common Market”, as the DPP claimed this would lead to a flood of 
Chinese labour migration to Taiwan. Moreover, the DPP warned that 
the KMT would sell out Taiwan through its CCP–KMT alliance, with 
its ads showing images of KMT leaders shaking hands with Hu Jintao 
(㜑䥖☔) and then images of Chinese missiles. Two years later the 
theme switched to ads attacking the proposal for ECFA and its po-
tential consequences. These themes were largely dropped by the 
DPP, which instead adopted a vague stance on China in 2012, prefer-
ring to ignore the issue in its propaganda. The anti-China or anti-uni-
fication rhetoric of previous campaigns was also missing. Tsai did 
appear willing to accept most of the agreements reached under the 
first Ma term with China, implying she would not risk the cross-Strait 
instability associated with the DPP era. She also raised the idea of 
establishing a “Taiwan consensus” on how to deal with China, but 
was vague on the practicalities. Like Chen in 2000, Tsai was trying to 
convince voters that she would be a safe pair of hands regarding Chi-
na. One such signal was her statement on ROC National Day 2011 
that “Taiwan is the ROC, the ROC is Taiwan, and the ROC govern-
ment is the government of Taiwan”. Schubert (2012: 147) suggests 
this was “invoking the spirit” of the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s 
Future, in which the DPP recognised the ROC and made the argu-
ment that there is no need to declare independence as Taiwan is al-
ready independent. However, cross-Strait relations have changed so 
radically over the last decade since the resolution was originally 
passed. Thus, Tsai struggled to convince voters that she really had an 
answer to how she would handle cross-Strait relations differently 
from Chen or build on what had been achieved under Ma.  
In the 2008 campaign the KMT was relatively cautious on China 
policy in order to avoid the accusation that it would betray Taiwan. 
Thus, it focused more on attacking the DPP for corruption and poor 
government performance. In contrast, because the most important 
achievements of the first Ma term lay in its breakthroughs in cross-
Strait relations and Tsai was uncomfortable with this issue, the KMT 
tried to set the agenda on this matter. The KMT adopted a number 
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of strategies to address the issue. A first method was to stress the 
positive consequences of integration for Taiwan’s farmers. A number 
of KMT ads explained how Taiwan had exported more fruit in three 
years under the KMT than in eight years under the DPP and that 
certain fruits have sold especially well in China, Japan and even 
America. One such ad visualised these exports through images of 
people with fruit-shaped heads being widely acclaimed abroad. Simi-
larly, it issued an ad on 12 December 2011 praising the role of the 
ECFA in increasing Taiwan’s economic growth rate, GDP and in-
creased agricultural exports (including tea and fish), along with 
growth in consumer spending. A second approach was to convince 
the Taishang (Taiwanese business community) that only the KMT 
government could protect the interests of the Taishang through its 
cross-Strait policies. On 27 November 2011, the KMT issued a TV 
ad that was designed to look like a TV news interview in which Ma 
praised the role that Taishang play in improving cross-Strait relations 
and promoting Taiwan’s economic growth. This was part of a con-
certed KMT attempt to appeal to the Taishang to come back to vote 
and thus ensure Ma was re-elected. A third approach was to compare 
the KMT’s cross-Strait record with that of the DPP. On 3 January 
2012, a KMT ad started with images of economic prosperity in 2011, 
and then pressed the rewind button with some poor economic figures 
from the DPP era. It urged voters not to let everything go back to the 
start point (ࡕ䇃а࠷䘰എ৏唎, bie rang yiqie tuihui yuandian). It then 
showed positive economic statistics, including the 10.72 per cent 
growth rate in 2010 and the 65 per cent growth in tourists coming to 
Taiwan. The ad does not specify Chinese tourists and tourist num-
bers have increased from a range of markets. However, any viewer 
who has recently been through a Taiwanese airport, one of Taiwan’s 
tourist hotspots or large hotels, would be aware that the fastest grow-
ing source of new tourists is from China. Another of the compara-
tive-style ads accused the previous DPP government of locking up 
the nation’s economy, which was visualised in the form of a Gul-
liver’s Travels-type giant tied down by hundreds of tiny ropes. Then 
under the KMT these ropes are broken by policies such as ECFA and 
the visa-free expansion. Finally, Ma and his running mate Wu Den-
yih (੣ᮖ㗙, Wu Dunyi) call on the Taiwanese giants that created the 
Taiwan miracle to stand up again over the next golden ten years. This 
ad again reflects the KMT message used in both 2008 and 2012 that, 
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under their management, Taiwan can have international space, har-
monious cross-Strait relations and strong economic growth.  
In 2012 the KMT tended to leave direct attacks against DPP 
presidential candidate Tsai’s cross-Strait policies to newspaper ads. 
For instance, an ad carrying the slogan “Supporting Ma” (ᥪ俜, ting 
Ma) was sponsored by the Mainland Taishang Ma Wu Campaign 
Support Association (བྷ䲨ਠ୶俜੣ㄦ䚨ᖼᨤ㑭ᴳ, Dalu Taishang Ma 
Wu jingxuan houyuan zonghui) (China Times 2011). It first outlined the 
benefits for Taiwan under Ma’s continued presidency. These included  
 how Taiwan benefits from the stable cross-Strait relations under 
the 1992 consensus and Ma’s three noes (no unification, no in-
dependence, no use of force);  
 how commercial opportunities for Taiwanese business have 
rapidly expanded under Ma, touting the benefits of cross-Strait 
agreements such as ECFA and proposed investor protection 
agreement for Taiwanese business;  
 Taiwan’s expanded international relations under Ma; and  
 how cross-Strait cooperation will be the best way for Taiwan to 
avoid being affected by the European debt crisis.  
The ad then goes on to list what its sponsors believe would happen if 
Tsai were to win. Firstly, it argued that without the 1992 consensus 
and by supporting one country on each side (а䚺а഻, yi bian yi guo), 
Mainland China would not have contacts with a DPP government. 
This would reduce Chinese tourist groups and Taiwanese exports to 
China, which would have a damaging impact on Taiwan’s economy. 
The ad also claimed that this would prevent further SEF-ARATS 
talks and create obstacles for the implementation of the 16 existing 
cross-Strait agreements. This would severely damage the interests of 
Taiwanese people. It also argued that a Tsai win would damage Tai-
wan’s international relations Lastly, the ad stated that a Tsai govern-
ment with limited government experience and lacking support in the 
huge Chinese market would lead Taiwan into recession, reduced 
household income, stock market crash and increased unemployment. 
This was just one of a large number of supposedly Taishang spon-
sored ads in support of Ma and his contribution to better cross-Strait 
relations and economic benefits. 
Considering the vagueness of the DPP’s stance on China in 
2012, it is surprising how little the KMT attacked Tsai’s cross-Strait 
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policies in its ads. In one KMT television ad, the former Health Min-
ister Yang Chih-liang commented, “I really have not heard or seen 
what are her (Tsai) actual policies are”. While the analysis of the ads 
seems to confirm this, the same could also be said about Ma’s plans 
for his second term regarding China. Unlike in 2008, where the KMT 
offered a clear vision on what it hoped to do on China, in 2012 it 
preferred to concentrate on contrasting its record in power to the 
alleged failures of the DPP era. One of the few occasions Ma offered 
anything new on China policy was when he raised the possibility of a 
peace agreement with China in his Golden Ten-Year plan in October 
2011. However, when public opinion reacted badly to the idea, he 
quickly reassured voters that this would need to be approved by a 
referendum (Schubert 2012: 148). Nevertheless, when the post-elec-
tion surveys asked why voters had opted for Ma, the most popular 
reason chosen was because of his cross-Strait policy (TVBS Poll Cen-
ter 2012c).  
Closely related to the role of the China issue was that of big 
business on the 2012 campaign. Traditionally, big business has tended 
to be more supportive of the KMT than the DPP. However, there 
have been occasions when major entrepreneurs have come out in 
support of the DPP, such as in the 2000 presidential campaign entre-
preneurs Hsu Wen-long (䁡᮷喽, Xu Wenlong) from Chimei Group 
and Chang Yung-fa (ᕥ῞Ⲭ, Zhang Rongfa) from Evergreen backed 
Chen. In 2012, there appeared to be a clearer preference of big busi-
ness for the KMT. In the final week of the campaign, over a hundred 
prominent local entrepreneurs came out in support of Ma. This was 
quite damaging to Tsai’s campaign, as some of those entrepreneurs 
were usually considered as pro-DPP supporters, such as Chang 
Yung-fa, Liao Chin-hsiang (ᔆ䥖⾕, Liao Jinxiang) from Chimei and 
Huang Mao-hsiung (哳㤲䳴, Huang Maoxiong) from TECO (Taipei 
Times 2012). Without naming any candidate of preference, most of 
them publicly stated their support of the 1992 Consensus and, there-
fore, stable cross-Strait relations – an implicit way of supporting Ma.  
Looking ahead to 2016 
Looking ahead, should we expect the national elections in 2016 to 
resemble any of the earlier campaigns? The local elections in Novem-
ber 2014 will be a barometer of the mood of the nation. However, 
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despite outpolling the KMT in 2010 local elections, the DPP failed to 
win in 2012. The overall political situation looks more similar to the 
half-way point in the second DPP term. In both cases, the incumbent 
president has/had low public satisfaction rates and faced a very hos-
tile social movement(s). In 2006, this was the anti-corruption Red 
Shirts and today Ma faces a very hostile civil society. However, unlike 
in 2006 when the KMT was preparing to implement its China policies 
once it returned to power, today the opposition DPP party does not 
yet look like government in waiting. As in 2012, it appears likely that 
cross-Strait relations will again be the dominant issue, although the 
Sunflower movement and the controversial Cross-Strait Services 
Agreement suggests it may no longer be such a positive issue for the 
KMT. A final possibility that cannot be ruled out is that there will be 
a divided Pan Blue set of candidates, as this has occurred in three out 
of five previous presidential campaigns.  
Conclusions  
In this paper we focused on comparing the 2012 elections with earlier 
national campaigns. The DPP attempted to regain power in 2012 by 
learning some of the lessons from its disastrous defeats of 2008. 
However, its recovery was not quite enough to convince voters it was 
ready to return to power. The KMT opted to take a very different 
approach to its winning formula from 2008. Ma and the KMT were 
able to campaign quite effectively on their record from the first term, 
particularly on the revolution in Taiwan’s external relations. Despite 
the attention to external issues in the media coverage of this cam-
paign, we suggest that domestic factors were as important in deter-
mining the outcome. The election has created a much more balanced 
party system and greater checks on ruling party power. Thus, unlike 
in 2008, today the KMT does not have a sufficient mandate for the 
kind of radical reforms seen in Ma’s first term.  
Both leading parties will need to learn key lessons from the 2012 
campaign if they are to win the next round of national elections in 
2016. A crucial challenge for the DPP will be to develop a convincing 
China policy, as this issue needs to be addressed for national-level 
elections. This will require the party to first reach an internal consen-
sus on China and may require sacrificing of some of the party’s core 
values and possibly risk party defections. The KMT will also face a 
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similar challenge when devising its vision for Taiwan’s future in the 
post-Ma era. Both parties will face difficulties regarding how to re-
solve the nomination for 2016, and this struggle has already begun. 
Since the late 1990s, Ma has generally been the most popular KMT 
politician and the party became increasingly dependent on his appeal 
to win elections after 2000. A smooth nomination process to select 
Ma’s successor will be critical for the KMT’s re-election chances. The 
DPP faces a similar challenge and it is quite possible that Tsai will 
emerge as the presidential candidate again. However, she will need to 
find a way to broaden her and the DPP’s appeal beyond its core sup-
port bases. Lastly, if the DPP wishes to become the ruling party, it 
will need to place greater emphasis on winning legislative seats. For 
too long, the party has prioritised presidential elections. However, a 
lesson from the Chen era is that without a legislative majority, a DPP 
president would again be severely constrained.  
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